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Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in 
Life (2014) provides the most lively and comprehen-
sive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It 
contains a reworked and expanded version of the view 
he first developed in Living without Free Will (2001). 
Important objections to the early book are answered, 
some slight modifications are introduced, and the 
overall account is significantly embellished—for ex-
ample, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational 
deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s ac-
tions are causally determined (ch.5) and develops a 
forward-looking theory of moral responsibility con-
sistent with free will skepticism (ch.6). A significant 
contribution to the field, Free Will, Agency, and Mean-
ing in Life is destined to become a classic and is es-
sential reading for anyone interested in free will and 
moral responsibility. 
The goal of the book is to advocate for free will skep-
ticism: the view that what we do, and the way we are, 
is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control 
and because of this we are never morally responsible 
for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that 
would make us truly deserving of blame or praise. Per-
eboom follows tradition here in defining “free will” in 
terms of the control in action required for a core sense 
of moral responsibility. “This sense of moral respon-
sibility, the one at issue in the free will debate, is set 
apart by the notion of basic desert (Feinberg 1970; Per-
eboom 2001, 2007a; G. Strawson 1994; Fischer 2007: 
82; Clarke 2005; Scanlon 2013). For an agent to be 
morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it 
to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be 
blamed if she understood that it was morally wrong, 
and she would deserve to be praised if she understood 
that it was morally exemplary” (2). Such desert is ba-
sic in the sense that “the agent would deserve to be 
blamed or praised just because she has performed the 
action, given an understanding of its moral status, and 
not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist 
or contractualist considerations” (2). 
Pereboom’s argument against this sort of free will is 
known as hard incompatibilism, which amounts to a 
rejection of both compatibilism and libertarianism. 
Hard incompatibilism maintains that the sort of free 
will required for basic desert moral responsibility is 
incompatible with causal determination by factors 
beyond the agent’s control and also with the kind of 
indeterminacy in action required by the most plausi-
ble versions of libertarianism. In addition to hard in-
compatibilism, Pereboom also defends optimistic skep-
ticism—which maintains that life without free will 
and desert-based moral responsibility would not be 
as devastating to our conceptions of agency, morality, 
and meaning in life as some suggest, and in certain 
respects it may even be beneficial. “In particular, this 
conception is wholly compatible with rational delib-
eration, with practically viable notions of morality and 
moral responsibility, with a workable system of deal-
ing with criminal behavior, and with a secure sense of 
meaning in life” (4). 
Pereboom’s overall argument can be sketched as fol-
lows: Against the view that free will is compatible with 
the causal determination of our actions by natural fac-
tors beyond our control, Pereboom argues that there is 
no relevant difference between this prospect and our 
actions being causally determined by manipulators. 
Against event causal libertarianism, he advances the 
disappearing agent objection, according to which on 
this view the agent cannot settle whether a decision 
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occurs, and hence cannot have the control required for 
moral responsibility. Against a non-causal libertarian-
ism, he likewise argues that it has no plausible propos-
al of the control in action required for responsibility. 
He goes on to argue that while agent-causal libertar-
ianism may supply this sort of control, it cannot be 
reconciled with our best physical theories. Since this 
exhausts the options for views on which we have the 
sort of free will at issue, he concludes that free will 
skepticism is the only remaining position. Finally, 
Pereboom defends the optimistic view that conceiv-
ing of life without free will would not be devastating 
to our conceptions of agency, morality, and meaning 
in life, and may even be beneficial.
In this précis I will provide a detailed summary of the 
arguments that lead Pereboom to these conclusions—
including his disappearing agent objection (ch.2), his 
argument against agent-causal libertarianism (ch.3), 
his four-case argument (ch.4), and his defense of opti-
mistic skepticism (ch.5-8). My goal is simply to pres-
ent Pereboom’s arguments in a clear and concise man-
ner. Providing a comprehensive summary of Free Will, 
Agency, and Meaning in Life, without any additional 
commentary or critical comments, will allow readers 
to evaluate Pereboom’s arguments for themselves. It 
will also allow the articles to follow in this book sym-
posium—those by John Martin Fisher, Dana Nelkin, 
and Derk Pereboom—to provide their comments 
without having to summarize the arguments in full. 
Readers can then refer back to this précis for addi-
tional clarification or details on any particular argu-
ment.   
Chapter 1: Defending a Source View
Pereboom begins by arguing for a source view of mor-
al responsibility by way of a Frankfurt-style case he 
first developed in Living without Free Will. Before 
laying out that case, however, it is important to first 
draw some distinctions and define some terminology. 
Source views contend that an agent’s being morally re-
sponsible for an action (in the basic desert sense) is, or 
would be, explained primarily by the action’s having a 
causal history in which she is the source of her action 
in a specific way. Such views are contrasted with lee-
way accounts, which instead maintain that an agent’s 
moral responsibility for an action is explained by the 
availability to her of alternative possibilities, for exam-
ple by the ability to refrain from doing what she has 
actually done. 
Additionally, a source theorist might be a compatibi-
list (Fischer 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McK-
enna 2005; Sartorio 2011, 2013) or an incompatibil-
ist (Stump 1990, 1996; Zagzebski 1991, 2000; Hunt 
2000, 2005; Shabo 2010); just as a leeway theorist may 
be a compatibilist (Moore 1912; Ayer 1954; Vihvelin 
2013) or incompatibilist (van Inwagen 1983; Kane 
1996). Incompatibilists maintain that the causal deter-
mination of our actions by factors beyond our control 
is incompatible with the sort of free will required for 
basic desert moral responsibility —either because it 
precludes the ability to do otherwise (leeway incom-
patibilism) or because it is inconsistent with one’s be-
ing the “ultimate source” of action (source incompat-
ibilism). Compatibilists, on the other hand, maintain 
that determinism is in fact compatible with the abil-
ity to do otherwise (leeway compatibilism) or with the 
agent’s being the source of her action in the required 
way (source compatibilism).   
Pereboom is a source incompatibilist. He rejects the 
sort of incompatibilism for which the availability of 
alternative possibilities is crucial to explaining mor-
al responsibility in the basic desert sense, and accepts 
instead an incompatibilism that ascribes the more sig-
nificant role to an action’s causal history, to the actual 
causal sequence that produces it (Fischer 1982, 1994, 
2007; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Satorio 2011). As 
Pereboom describes it:
My view is thus a source as opposed to a leeway 
incompatibilism. Agent-causal libertarianism 
is commonly conceived as an incompatibilist 
position in which an agent can be the source 
of her action in the way required for moral re-
sponsibility in the sense at issue, and as a result 
proponents of this view are typically source in-
compatibilists. But one might also be a source 
incompatibilist and seriously doubt that we 
have the sort of free will required for this sort 
of moral responsibility, and this is the position 
I advocate. (4)
Pereboom’s free will skepticism is therefore a result of 
his source incompatibilism combined with his rejec-
tion of libertarianism.  Pereboom lays out his argu-
ments against libertarianism in chapters 2 and 3, and 
presents his manipulation argument against compati-
bilism in chapter 4. The goal of chapter 1, however, is 
simply to defend the source view against recent ob-
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In recent decades, and largely due to Frankfurt-style 
examples (Frankfurt 1969) against the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities (PAP), it has become com-
mon to claim that an agent’s moral responsibility for 
an action is not explained by the availability to her of 
alternative possibilities but rather by the agent’s being 
the actual source of her action in a specific way (9). 
Some philosophers, however, have resisted this trend 
and have criticized Frankfurt-style cases by present-
ing the dilemma defense of the leeway view (Kane 
1985; Widerker 1995; Ginet 1996). In this chapter, 
Pereboom defends his Frankfurt-style case, known 
as the Tax Evasion Case, against such objections. In 
addition, he argues that “this sort of case yields an ef-
fective response to a different sort of objection which 
was originally raised by Ginet and recently developed 
by Christopher Franklin (2011) and David Palmer 
(2011), which focuses on the precise timing of what it 
is that the agent is responsible for” (5). 
In typical Frankfurt cases, an agent considers perform-
ing some action, but a neuroscientist is concerned that 
she will not come through. So if she were to manifest 
an indication that she will not or might not perform 
the action, the neuroscientist would intervene. But 
as things actually go, the neuroscientist remains idle, 
since the agent performs the action on her own. “The 
idea is that even though the agent could not have 
avoided the action she performs, she is still intuitively 
morally responsible for this action” (9). While Frank-
furt cases have been extremely influential in moving 
people away from leeway and toward source accounts 
of moral responsibility, Robert Kane (1985), David 
Widerker (1995), and Carle Ginet (1996) have devel-
oped a significant objection against them. 
According to the Kane/Widerker/Ginet objection, 
Frankfurt cases face a dilemma: either the propo-
nents of Frankfurt-style examples are presupposing 
the truth of causal determinism (in which case they 
are begging the question against the incompatibilist) 
or they are presupposing the truth of indeterminism 
(in which case they are wrong in assuming the agent 
could not have chosen otherwise). As Pereboom sum-
marizes the objection: “In Frankfurt examples the ac-
tual situation will feature a prior sign that signals the 
fact that intervention is not required. If in a proposed 
case the prior sign causally determined the action, or 
if it were associated with some factor that did, the in-
tervener’s (or his device’s) predictive ability could be 
explained. However, then the libertarian would not 
and could not be expected to have the intuition that 
the agent is morally responsible. But if the relation-
ship between the prior sign and the action was not 
causally deterministic in such ways, then it’s open that 
the agent could have done otherwise despite the oc-
currence of the prior sign” (2014, 14). Critics therefore 
maintain that, either way, an alternative-possibilities 
condition on moral responsibility emerges unscathed. 
To understand Pereboom’s response to this objec-
tion, it’s important to first understand his criterion 
for robustness. “The core intuition that underlies the 
proposal to explain moral responsibility by access to 
alternative possibilities is that to be blameworthy for 
an action, an agent must have been able to do some-
thing that would have resulted in her being ‘off the 
hook’ (Pereboom 2001: 1)” (10-11). Put differently, 
“to be blameworthy for an action an agent must have 
an exempting alternative possibility, one that, should 
he avail himself of it, would exempt him from blame 
(Moya 2006: 67)” (11). In earlier work, Pereboom 
spelled this out in terms of robustness—that for an 
alternative possibility to be robust, it must be one that, 
had the agent taken it instead, would have precluded 
him from the particular responsibility he actually has 
for his action. Robustness also has an epistemic com-
ponent: if an agent were blameworthy because he had 
an alternative possibility available to him, it must be 
that he in some sense understood that or how it was 
available to him (11). 
Trying to capture these two components, Pereboom 
originally stated the robustness criterion as follows—
this was meant as a substantial necessary condition 
for what it is for an alternative possibility to be robust: 
Robustness (A): For an agent to have a robust 
alternative to her action A, that is, an alterna-
tive relevant per se to explaining why she is 
morally responsible for A, she must have un-
derstood that instead she could have volun-
tarily done something as a result of which she 
would have been precluded from the moral re-
sponsibility she actually has for A. (11)
But due to objections raised by Jonathan Vance, Dana 
Nelkin, and others, Pereboom acknowledges in chap-
ter 1 that a more precise criterion for robustness is 
needed. After considering four main concerns for the 
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Robustness (A) formulation, he arrives at the follow-
ing new criterion:  
Robustness (B): For an agent to have a robust 
alternative to her immoral action A, that is, an 
alternative relevant per se to explaining why 
she is blameworthy for performing A, it must 
be that 
1. She instead could have voluntarily acted or 
refrained from acting as a result of which 
she would be blameless, and
2. For at least one such exempting acting or 
refraining, she was cognitively sensitive to 
the fact that she could so voluntarily act or 
refrain, and to the fact that if she voluntar-
ily so acted or refrained she would then be, 
or would likely be, blameless. (13)
We can now characterize leeway views, whether com-
patibilist or incompatibilist, “as those that affirm that 
for an agent to be blameworthy for an action, she must 
have available to her a robust alternative possibility, 
that is, one that satisfies Robustness (B)” (13). Addi-
tionally, leeway incompatibilists hold that “the reason 
causal determinism precludes moral responsibility is 
that it rules out alternative possibilities altogether, 
but most importantly, those of the robust sort” (14). 
Source views, by contrast, deny this.
Pereboom, being a source theorist, now introduces his 
Tax Evasion Cases—a modified Frankfurt-style exam-
ple designed to avoid the dilemma reply. 
Tax Evasion (2): Joe is considering claiming a 
tax deduction for the registration fee that he 
paid when he bought a house. He knows that 
claiming this deduction is illegal, but that he 
probably won’t be caught, and that if he were, 
he could convincingly plead ignorance. Sup-
pose he has a strong but not always overriding 
desire to advance his self-interest regardless of 
its cost to others and even if it involves illegal 
activity. In addition, the only way that in this 
situation he could fail to choose to evade taxes 
is for moral reasons, of which he is aware. He 
could not, for example, fail to make this choice 
for no reason or simply on a whim. Moreover, 
it is causally necessary for his failing to choose 
to evade taxes in this situation that he attain a 
level of attentiveness to moral reasons. Joe can 
secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily. 
However, his attaining this level of attentive-
ness is not causally sufficient for his failing to 
choose to evade taxes. If he were to attain this 
level of attentiveness, he could, exercising his 
libertarian free will, either choose to evade taxes 
or refrain from so choosing (without the inter-
vener’s device in place). However, to ensure that 
he will choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist 
has, unbeknownst to Joe, implanted a device in 
his brain which, were it to sense the requisite 
level of attentiveness, would electronically sim-
ulate the right neural centers so as to inevitably 
result in his making this choice. As it happens, 
Joe does not attain this level of attentiveness 
to his moral reasons, and he chooses to evade 
taxes on his own, while the device remains idle 
(Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003, 2009b). (15)
Pereboom maintains that in this situation, Joe is in-
tuitively blameworthy for choosing to evade taxes de-
spite the fact that he did not have a robust alternative 
(15). And because the case includes a number of fea-
tures that distinguish it from earlier Frankfurt cases, 
it is claimed to avoid the dilemma outlined above. The 
unique features are these: “the cue for intervention is a 
necessary condition for the agent’s availing herself of 
any robust alternative possibility (without the inter-
vener’s device in place), while the cue for intervention 
itself is not a robust alternative possibility, and the ab-
sence at any specific time of the cue for intervention 
in no sense causally determines the action the agent 
actually performs” (15).  
In Tax Evasion (2), it’s not merely the presence of a 
necessary condition for doing otherwise that’s impor-
tant. Rather, “this case features a necessary condition 
for doing otherwise the absence of which at any specif-
ic time will not causally determine the agent to perform 
the action” (15). According to Pereboom, this allows 
it to be the case that “at no specific time is the agent 
causally determined to perform the action, which fa-
cilitates satisfaction of a key libertarian condition on 
moral responsibility” (15). Here’s how Pereboom de-
scribes it:
In Tax Evasion (2), the necessary condition for 
Joe’s not deciding to evade taxes, i.e., his having 
the requisite level of attentiveness to the moral 
reasons, is the right sort, since its absence at 
any specific time does not causally determine 
his deciding to evade taxes. For at any particu-
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lar time at which the level of attentiveness is 
absent, Joe could still make it occur at a later 
time, and thus he is not causally determined 
to decide to evade taxes by its absence at the 
previous time…(15)
It’s also important to note that the case does fea-
ture alternative possibilities that are available to the 
agent—Joe’s achieving higher levels of attentiveness 
to moral reasons—but Pereboom argues that these al-
ternatives are not robust. 
At this point one might object that given that 
the intervener’s device is in place, by voluntar-
ily achieving the specified higher level of at-
tentiveness Joe would have voluntarily done 
something as a result of which he would have 
been precluded from the blameworthiness he 
actually incurs. Had he voluntarily achieved 
the requisite level of attentiveness, the inter-
vention would have taken place, whereupon he 
would not have been blameworthy for decid-
ing to evade taxes. But this alternative possibil-
ity is not robust. Joe is not even minimally cog-
nitively sensitive to the fact that by voluntarily 
achieving the requisite level of attentiveness he 
would not be (or would likely not be) blame-
worthy. Moreover, he has no reason whatso-
ever to believe this. True, were he voluntarily 
to attain this attentiveness, the intervention 
would take place, and he would then not have 
been blameworthy. Still, Joe has no inkling, 
and no evidence, that the intervention would 
then take place and that as a result he would 
not be blameworthy. (16)
According to Pereboom, Joe believes that achieving 
this level of attentiveness is compatible with his freely 
deciding to evade taxes anyway, and he has no reason 
to suspect otherwise. “We can even specify that he be-
lieves that if he did achieve this level of attentiveness, 
he would still be very likely to decide to evade taxes” 
(16). Intuitively, then, Joe is blameworthy for actually 
so deciding. 
The remainder of ch.1 is dedicated to addressing 
objections to the Tax Evasion (2) Case. Pereboom 
responds to objections by Widerker (2006), Kane 
(2007), Ginet (2002), and others, and argues that 
each of them can be adequately dealt with. He con-
cludes that there is good reason to reject the leeway 
view and adopt a source view, which maintains that 
for an agent to be morally responsible for an action 
she must be the source of her action in an appropriate 
way. More specifically, he embraces source incompat-
ibilism, which contends that this requires the action’s 
actual causal history be indeterminisitic—i.e., “the ac-
tion cannot be causally determined by factors beyond 
the agent’s control, such as the remote past together 
with the laws of nature” (28). 
Chapter 2: Problems for Event-Causal and 
Non-Causal Libertarianism
After having defended the source view in ch.1, Per-
eboom turns his attention in ch.2 to arguing against 
two leading varieties of libertarianism. In particular, 
Pereboom develops his “disappearing agent” objection 
against event-causal libertarianism, which argues that 
this position cannot accommodate the requirement 
that in an indeterministic context the agent or some-
thing about the agent settles whether the decision in 
question occurs, and for this reason lacks the control 
in action required for moral responsibility in the ba-
sic desert sense (5). In Living without Free Will, Per-
eboom directed this objection toward Robert Kane’s 
(1996) famed account, but here he focuses instead on 
Mark Balaguer’s (2009) version of event-causal liber-
tarianism. Pereboom also takes the opportunity in this 
chapter to argue against non-causal libertarianism, ob-
jecting that advocates of this position “use prima facie 
causal language to express the purportedly non-causal 
relation, and that either causation is being invoked, or 
if it is not, the control required for moral responsibil-
ity is absent” (40).  
Pereboom begins by differentiating three major ver-
sions of libertarianism: event-causal, non-causal, and 
agent-causal types (30-31). Libertarian views, in gen-
eral, maintain that human beings have the capacity to 
freely will actions, and crucial to an agent’s being free-
ly willed is that it not be causally determined by fac-
tors beyond the agent’s control. Event-causal libertari-
anism, in particular, maintains that actions (conceived 
as agent-involving events) are caused solely by prior 
events, such as an agent’s having a desire or a belief at 
a time, and some type of indeterminacy in the produc-
tion of action by appropriate events is held to be nec-
essary for the sort of free will under discussion (Kane 
1996; Ekstrom 2000; Balaguer 2009). Non-causal 
libertarianism, on the other hand, maintains that no 
cause is needed for human decisions. Contemporary 
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non-causal theorists include Carl Ginet (1990, 1996, 
2007), Hugh McCann (1998), and Stewart Goetz 
(2008). Typically, non-causal theorists also maintain 
that additional conditions must be met for an action 
to be free. Agent-causal libertarianism, the most met-
aphysically demanding of the three views, appeals to 
agents who as substances have the power to cause 
decisions without being causally determined to do 
so (Kant 1781/1787/1987; Reid 1788/1983; Taylor 
1966, 1974; Chisholm 1964, 1976; O’Connor 2000, 
2009; Clarke 1993, 2003; Griffith 2010). 
Pereboom notes that “event-causal libertarianism 
is typically regarded as the most attractive of these 
views, all else being equal.” And this is because the 
“idea of an uncaused event and the notion of a sub-
stance-cause are regarded with suspicion” (2014, 31). 
Yet despite its attractiveness, event-causal libertarian-
ism faces a devastating objection known as the disap-
pearing agent objection. The objection runs as follows:  
The disappearing agent objection: Consider a 
decision that occurs in a context in which the 
agent’s moral motivations favor that decision, 
and her prudential motivations favor her re-
fraining from making it, and the strengths 
of these motivations are in equipoise. On an 
event-causal libertarian picture, the relevant 
causal conditions antecedent to the decision, 
i.e., the occurrence of certain agent-involv-
ing events, do not settle whether the decision 
will occur, but only render the occurrence of 
the decision about 50% probable. In fact, be-
cause no occurrence of antecedent events set-
tles whether the decision will occur, and only 
antecedent events are causally relevant, nothing 
settles whether the decision will occur. Thus it 
can’t be that the agent or anything about the 
agent settles whether the decision will occur, 
and she therefore will lack the control required 
for basic desert moral responsibility for it (Per-
eboom 2001, 2004, 2007a). (32)
     
The concern raised by Pereboom’s disappearing agent 
objection is that “because event-causal libertarian 
agents will not have the power to settle whether the 
decision will occur, they cannot have the role in action 
that this sort of moral responsibility demands” (32).  
Consider, for instance, Balaguer’s event-causal lib-
ertarian account. As Balaguer describes it, his view 
“does not involve any sort of irreducible agent causa-
tion, but it does hold that undetermined L-free deci-
sions are (ordinarily) causally influenced by—indeed, 
probabilistically caused by—agent-involving events, 
most notably, events having to do with the agent hav-
ing certain reasons and intentions” (2009, 67). For 
Balaguer, the paradigm case of a free choice is one in 
which the agent’s reasons and motivation are in equi-
poise. He calls this a torn decision: a decision in which 
the agent (a) has reasons for two or more options and 
feels torn as to which set of reasons is stronger, that is, 
has no conscious belief as to which option is best, giv-
en her reasons; and that (b) decides without resolving 
the conflict—that is, the person has the experience of 
“just choosing” (Balaguer 2009, 71). 
This definition of a torn decision sets up Balaguer’s 
conception of libertarian freedom—L-freedom: 
If an ordinary human torn decision is wholly 
undetermined, then it is L-free—that is, it is 
not just undetermined but also appropriately 
non-random, and the indeterminacy increases 
or procures the appropriate non-randomness. 
(2009, 78)  
Balaguer, in turn, characterizes appropriate non-ran-
domness in terms of authorship and control: “in order 
for a decision to be L-free, it has to be authored and 
controlled by the agent in question; that is, it has to 
be her decision, and she has to control which option 
is chosen” (2009, 83). Bringing all the pieces together, 
Balaguer defines the notion of torn-decision indeter-
minism, or TDW-indeterminism, as follows: 
TDW-indeterminism: Some of our torn de-
cisions are wholly undetermined at the mo-
ment of choice, that is, the moment-of-choice 
probabilities of the various reasons-based 
tied-for-best option match the reasons-based 
probabilities, so that these moments-of-choice 
probabilities are all roughly even, given the 
complete state of the world and the laws of 
nature, and the choice occurs without any fur-
ther input, that is, without anything else being 
significantly causally relevant to which option 
is chosen. (2009, 34)
In the case of a torn TDW-indeterminist decision, 
then, there is no mismatch between the underlying 
probabilities for the various options at the time of the 
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decision and the probabilities for those options at that 
time based on the agent’s consciously available rea-
sons (34). 
While this account does a nice job articulating a plau-
sible set of epistemic and metaphysical conditions 
necessary for event-causal libertarianism, Pereboom 
objects that it does not adequately deal with the dis-
appearing agent objection since it fails to secure the 
control necessary for basic desert moral responsibility. 
“Intuitively, this sort of control requires the agent or at 
least something about the agent to settle whether the 
decision in question will occur, and the event-causal 
libertarian view does not allow for this in the case of 
torn decisions” (34). Pereboom’s objection therefore 
maintains that “on the event-causal libertarian view, 
torn decisions cannot, in Balaguer’s terminology, be 
appropriately non-random, and the indeterminacy in 
question cannot increase or procure the appropriate 
non-randomness, because the theory does not allow 
either the agent or anything about the agent to settle 
whether such a decision will occur, and so the requisite 
control in action is precluded.” Moreover, adds Pere-
boom, “authorship is missing given that such control 
is required for authorship” (35).
The remainder of ch.2 is dedicated to (a) defending 
the disappearing agent objection against possible re-
plies, (b) extending the basic concern to non-causal 
views, (c) considering a possible mixed theory—one 
that includes event-causal and non-causal compo-
nents, and (d) arguing against a phenomenological 
defense of libertarianism. 
Against non-causal views, Pereboom argues that the 
control required for desert-based moral responsibility 
is once again absent. He also notes how advocates of 
such views use prima facie causal language to express 
the purportedly non-causal relation, compromising 
their non-causalism (see pages 40-41). Mixed theories, 
which incorporate components of both event-causal 
and non-causal accounts, fair no better according to 
Pereboom—and this is because they either smuggle in 
causal notions (in ways they deny) through a “making 
happen” or “difference-making” relation, or they be-
come incoherent (43-45). Finally, Pereboom considers 
a phenomenological defense of event-causal libertar-
ianism, which cites phenomenology in support of the 
claim that event-causal agents have the requisite kind 
of control in deciding (see, e.g., Balaguer 2009, 89-91; 
Kane 1996). Pereboom acknowledges that “when we 
make decisions we often have the phenomenology of 
control in acting, and perhaps even of the sort of con-
trol or free will that’s required for moral responsibility 
in the basic desert sense.” Yet in the free will debate, 
“serious questions are raised about whether a theory 
of agency that is causally deterministic or one that en-
dorses pure event-causal indeterminism can accom-
modate the veridicality of such phenomenology of 
control.” Pereboom therefore concludes that, “In the 
absence of a satisfying response to this concern, citing 
the phenomenology in support of control should not 
[be] counted as effective” (47). 
The conclusion of ch.2 is that event-causal and 
non-causal libertarian accounts both fail to secure 
the control in action necessary for basic desert moral 
responsibility. Chapter 3, to which I will now turn, 
provides Pereboom’s argument against agent-causal 
libertarianism. The conclusion reached at the end of 
ch.3 is that either a compatibilist view of free will is 
viable, or else free will skepticism is true. But chapter 
4 is devoted to setting out a manipulation argument 
against any form of compatibilism. Hence, chapters 
2-4 collectively represent Pereboom’s argument for 
free will skepticism. 
Chapter 3: The Prospects for Agent-Causal 
Libertarianism 
Agent-causal libertarianism attempts to secure the 
control missing from event-causal accounts by rein-
troducing the agent as a cause, not merely as involved 
in events, but rather fundamentally as a substance. 
Agent-causal theorists posit an agent who possess-
es a causal power, fundamentally as a substance, to 
cause a decision—or as O’Connor (2009) specifies, 
“the coming to be of a state of intention to carry out 
some action”—without being causally determined to 
do so, and thereby to settle, with the requisite con-
trol, whether this state of intention will occur (51). 
Pereboom maintains that agent-causal accounts are 
“substantive” and can withstand the kind of concerns 
outlined in the previous chapter, including the luck ob-
jection (cf. Mele 1999, 2006; Haji 2004). Agent-caus-
al accounts, Pereboom maintains, “deliver what the 
luck objection indicates is lacking in the event-causal 
libertarian’s account” (55)—i.e., involvement of the 
agent in the making of her decision. 
Yet despite the advantage agent-causal accounts have 
over event-causal accounts in specifying the control 
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needed for moral responsibility, they too are ulti-
mately unsatisfying (but for a different reason). Per-
eboom’s criticism of agent-causal libertarianism is 
rather straightforward: “our best empirical theories 
yield strong reasons to doubt that we are in fact agent 
causes of the sort that this theory specifies” (50). These 
reasons concern whether agent-causal libertarianism 
can be reconciled with what we would expect given 
our best physical theories. According to agent-causa-
tion, when an agent-cause makes a free decision, she 
causes it without being causally determined to do so. 
“But she at some point would affect the physical world 
distinct from the agent-cause” (66). Given that on our 
best physical theories the physical world is law-gov-
erned, the challenge is to reconcile agent-causation 
with the claim that the laws of physics govern the 
physical components of human action. 
There are two distinct options for an agent-causal lib-
ertarianism to attempt this reconciliation, but neither 
seems satisfying:  
Suppose first that the physical laws are de-
terministic, as they are, for example on Kant’s 
view. In his agent-causal picture, when an 
agent makes a free decision, she causes the 
decision without being causally determined 
to do so. On the path to action that results 
from this undetermined decision, alterations 
in the physical world, for example in her brain 
or some other part of her body, are produced. 
But it would seem that we would at this point 
encourage divergences from the deterministic 
laws. For the alterations in the physical world 
that result from the undetermined decisions 
would themselves not be causally determined, 
and they would thus not be governed by deter-
ministic law. One might object that it is pos-
sible that the physical alterations that result 
from free decisions just happens to dovetail 
with what could in principle be predicted on 
the basis of the deterministic laws, so nothing 
actually occurs that diverges from these laws. 
But this proposal would, at least prima facie, 
involve coincidences too wild to be credible. 
For this reason, it seems that agent-causal lib-
ertarianism is not reconcilable with the phys-
ical world’s being governed by deterministic 
laws. (66)
What if it was suggested instead that quantum in-
determinacy could help reconcile this problem (see, 
e.g., Clarke 1993, 2003; O’Connor 2000, 2009)? As 
Pereboom notes, “On one interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, the physical world is not in fact determin-
istic, but is rather governed by laws that are funda-
mentally merely probabilistic or statistical” (66). Let 
us suppose, then, that significant quantum indetermi-
nacy percolates up to neural indeterminacy at the level 
of decision or intention-formation. 
Still, it appears that wild coincidences would 
also arise on this suggestion. Consider the class 
of possible human actions each of which has a 
physical component whose antecedent prob-
ability of occurring is approximately 0.32…
Are free choices on the agent-causal libertari-
an model compatible with what the statistical 
laws lead us to expect about them? If agent-
caused free action were compatible with what 
according to the statistical law is overwhelm-
ingly likely, then for a large enough number of 
instances the possible actions in our class would 
have to be freely chosen close to 32 percent of 
the time. Then, for a large enough number of 
instances, the possible actions whose physical 
components have an antecedent probability of 
0.32 would almost certainly be freely chosen 
close to 32 percent of the time. But if the oc-
currence of these physical components were 
settled by the choices of agent-causes, then 
their actually being chosen close to 32 percent 
of the time would amount to a coincidence no 
less wild than the coincident of possible ac-
tions whose physical components have an an-
tecedent probability of about 0.99 being cho-
sen, over a large enough number of instances, 
close to 99 percent of time. The proposal that 
agent-caused free choices do not diverge from 
what the statistical laws predict for the phys-
ical components of our actions would run so 
sharply counter to what we would expect as 
to make it incredible (Pereboom 1995, 2001). 
(67)
Given that both options lead to wild coincidences, 
coincidences not to be expected and without an ex-
planation, Pereboom concludes that agent-causal lib-
ertarianism is unsatisfying. 
Hence, the conclusion of chapters 2 and 3 combined 
is that “while we might hope that we are free agents 
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of the libertarian kind, we shouldn’t regard this option 
as credible” (70). This leaves compatibilism as the re-
maining view that stands to vindicate the belief that 
we have the sort of free will required for moral re-
sponsibility in the basic desert sense. 
Chapter 4: A Manipulation Argument against 
Compatibilism  
Compatibilism maintains that the sort of free will re-
quired for desert-based moral responsibility is com-
patible with an agent’s being causally determined to 
act by factors beyond her control. Such a view has 
been so attractive that “a large proportion of contem-
porary philosophers classify themselves as compatibi-
lists” (71). Pereboom identifies two prominent routes 
to compatibilism. The first and more common route 
aims to differentiate causal circumstances of actions 
that exclude moral responsibility from those that do 
not. “The core idea is that moral responsibility requires 
some type of causal integration between the agent’s 
psychology and her action, while it does not demand 
the absence of causal determination” (71). The second 
route, the one advocated by P. F. Strawson (1962), 
“specifies that despite what incompatibilists suppose, 
the truth of determinism is irrelevant to whether we 
have the sort of free will required for moral responsi-
bility” (72). 
In the past, it was common for compatibilists to de-
fend a conditional account of the ability to do other-
wise (Hume 1748/2000; Hobbes 1654; Moore 1912; 
Ayer 1954). According to such accounts, to say that 
I could have acted otherwise is to claim that I would 
have acted otherwise if I had so chosen. But if Pere-
boom’s defense of the source view in ch.1 succeeds 
and a successful Frankfurt-style example is available, 
then “alternative possibilities will not play the prom-
inent role…these conditional accounts suggest” (72). 
According to Pereboom: “If the availability of alter-
native possibilities is not crucial to the sort of free will 
required for moral responsibility, the Consequence 
Argument, which aims to show that if determinism 
is true, no agent can ever do otherwise, can be side-
stepped…” (73). It is for this reason that Pereboom 
thinks the best anti-compatibilist strategy involves an 
argument from manipulation. The core idea of manip-
ulation arguments is that “an action’s being produced 
by a deterministic process that traces back to factors 
beyond the agent’s control, even when she satisfies all 
the causal conditions on moral responsibility speci-
fied by the contending compatibilist theories, presents 
in principle no less of a threat to moral responsibility 
than does deterministic manipulation by other agents” 
(73). 
Pereboom’s manipulation argument is known as the 
four-case argument. The argument sets out three exam-
ples of actions that involve manipulation, “the first of 
which features the most radical sort of manipulation 
consistent with the proposed compatibilist conditions 
and with intuitive conditions on agency, each pro-
gressively more like the fourth, which the compati-
bilist might envision to be ordinary and realistic, in 
which the action is causally determined in a natural 
way” (74-75). The challenge is for the compatibilist to 
point out a relevant and principled difference between 
any two adjacent cases that would show why the agent 
might be morally responsible in the latter example but 
not in the earlier one. Pereboom maintains that “this 
can’t be done, and that the agent’s non-responsibility 
therefore generalizes from the first of the manipula-
tion examples to the ordinary case” (75). Furthermore, 
since the first three cases set out examples of actions 
that involve manipulation, and in which the promi-
nent compatibilist causal conditions on moral respon-
sibility are satisfied, they also indicate that these con-
ditions are inadequate—“that is, they are not, together 
with some other uncontroversial necessary conditions 
for moral responsibility, sufficient for it” (74).  
Here’s the set-up (75-76): In each of the four cases 
Professor Plum decides to murder White for the sake 
of some personal advantage, and succeeds in doing 
so. The action under consideration is his decision to 
kill White—“a basic mental action” (75). Pereboom 
specifies that in each of the four cases, Plum’s deci-
sion to kill White satisfies the relevant compatibil-
ist-friendly conditions for acting freely. For example, 
it meets certain compatibilist conditions proposed by 
Hume: “it is not out of character, since for Plum it 
is generally true that selfish reasons weigh heavily—
too heavily when considered from the moral point of 
view—while in addition the desire that motivates him 
to act is nevertheless not irresistible for him, and in 
this sense he is not constrained to act” (75). The action 
also meets the compatibilist condition proposed by 
Harry Frankfurt (1971): “Plum’s effective desire (i.e., 
his will) to murder White conforms appropriately to 
his second-order desires for which effective desire he 
will have. That is, he wills to murder her, and wants to 
will to do so” (75). In addition, the action satisfies the 
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reasons-responsiveness condition advocated by John 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998): “Plum’s desire can 
be modified by, and some of them arise from, the ra-
tional consideration of his reasons, and if he believed 
that the bad consequences for himself that would re-
sult from his killing White would be more serve than 
he actually expects them to be, he would not have de-
cided to kill her” (75). Finally, this action also satisfies 
the related condition advanced by Jay Wallace (1994): 
“Plum has the general ability to grasp, apply, and reg-
ulate his actions by moral reasons. For instance, when 
egoistic reasons that count against acting morally are 
weak, he will typically act for moral reasons instead” 
(75). 
The question, then, is that supposing Plum is causally 
determined by factors beyond his control to decide 
as he does, is it plausible that he is morally responsi-
ble for his decision? The following four cases exhibit 
varying ways in which Plum’s decision to kill White 
might be causally determined by factors beyond his 
control. Case 1 involves manipulation by a team of 
neuroscientists. 
Case 1: A team of neuroscientists has the abil-
ity to manipulate Plum’s neural states at any 
time by radio-like technology. In this particu-
lar case, they do so by pressing a button just 
before he begins to reason about his situation, 
which they know will produce in him a neu-
ral state that realizes a strongly egoistic reason 
process, which the neuroscientists know will 
deterministically result in his decision to kill 
White. Plum would not have killed White had 
the neuroscientists not intervened, since his 
reasoning would then not have been sufficient-
ly egoistic to produce this decision. But at the 
same time, Plum’s effective first-order desire 
to kill White conforms to his second-order 
desire. In addition, his process of deliberation 
from which the decision results is reason-re-
sponsive; in particular, this type of process 
would have resulted in Plum’s refraining from 
deciding to kill White in certain situations in 
which his reasons were different. His reason-
ing is consistent with his character because it 
is frequently egoistic and sometimes strongly 
so. Still, it is not in general exclusively egoistic, 
because he sometimes successfully regulates 
his behavior by moral reasons, especially when 
the egoistic reasons are relatively weak. Plum 
is also not constrained to act as he does, for he 
does not act because of an irresistible desire—
the neuroscientists do not induce a desire of 
this sort. (76-77)
It’s intuitive, argues Pereboom, that Plum is not mor-
ally responsible in Case 1 despite the fact that his ac-
tions satisfy each of the compatibilist conditions. And 
Plum’s lack of moral responsibility is explained (at 
least on one candidate explanation) by the fact that 
his decision is causally determined by the neurosci-
entists’ intervention, which is beyond his control, to-
gether with the fact that he would not have decided 
to kill White had this intervention not occurred (77). 
The next case is more like the ordinary situation than 
Case 1 but it still involves manipulation. 
Case 2: Plum is just like an ordinary human 
being, except that a team of neuroscientists 
programmed him at the beginning of his life 
so that his reasoning is often but not always 
egoistic (as in Case 1), and at times strongly so, 
with the intended consequence that in his cur-
rent circumstances he is causally determined 
to engage in the egoistic reasons-responsive 
process of deliberation and to have the set of 
first and second-order desires that result in his 
decision to kill White. Plum has the general 
ability to regulate his actions by moral reasons, 
but in his circumstances, due to the strongly 
egoistic nature of his deliberative reasoning, he 
is causally determined to make his decision to 
kill. Yet he does not decide as he does because 
of an irresistible desire. The neural realization 
of his reasoning process and of his decision is 
exactly the same as it is in Case 1 (although 
their causal histories are different). (77)
Pereboom maintains that here again Plum is not mor-
ally responsible for his decision since “it would seem 
unprincipled to claim that here, by contract with Case 
1, Plum is morally responsible because the length of 
time between the programming and his decision is 
now great enough” (77-78). It’s irrelevant, argues Per-
eboom, whether the programming occurs a few sec-
onds before or forty years prior to the action. What 
is of relevance is that in both cases Plum’s decision to 
kill White is causally determined by factors beyond 
his control: “Causal determination by what the neu-
roscientists do, which is beyond his control, plausibly 
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explains Plum’s not being morally responsible in the 
first case, and it’s intuitive that he is not morally re-
sponsible in the second case for the same reason” (78). 
Pereboom further notes that if Plum lacks moral re-
sponsibility in Case 2, this once again indicates that 
the compatibilist conditions specified, either individ-
ually or in conjunction, are not sufficient for moral 
responsibility. 
Case 3 is more similar yet to our ordinary situation. It 
supposes that Plum was brought up in an environment 
in which self-interest and violence are more strongly 
encouraged than they are in ours, even though moral-
ity also has a part. 
Case 3: Plum is an ordinary human being, 
except that the training practices of his com-
munity causally determined the nature of his 
deliberative reasoning process so that they are 
frequently but not exclusively rationally ego-
istic (the resulting nature of his deliberative 
reasoning processes are exactly as they are in 
Cases 1 and 2). This training was completed 
before he developed the ability to prevent or 
alter these practices. Due to the aspect of his 
character produced by this training, in his pres-
ent circumstances he is causally determined 
to engage in the strongly egoistic reasons-re-
sponsive process of deliberation and to have 
the first and second-order desires that issue in 
his decision to kill White. While Plum does 
have the general ability to regulate his behav-
ior by moral reasons, in virtue of this aspect of 
his character and his circumstances he is caus-
ally determined to make his immoral decision, 
although he does not decide as he does due to 
an irresistible desire. The neural realization of 
his deliberative reasoning process and of the 
decision is just as it is in Cases 1 and 2. (78)
The challenge for the compatibilist is to explain how 
Plum could be morally responsible in Case 3 but fail 
to be morally responsible in Case 2. To successfully do 
this he must identify a feature of these scenarios that 
would explain the difference. But this is impossible, 
argues Pereboom, since “there is no such feature” (78). 
Hence, Plum’s exemption from responsibility in Cases 
1 and 2 generalizes to the near-to-normal Case 3.  
Case 4 deals with ordinary determinism. It differs 
from the previous cases in that other agents do not 
bring about Plum’s decision, but in all other relevant 
respects it is similar. 
Case 4: Everything that happens in our uni-
verse is causally determined by virtue of its past 
states together with the laws of nature. Plum is 
an ordinary human being, raised in normal cir-
cumstances, and again his reasoning processes 
are frequently but not exclusively egoistic, and 
sometimes strongly so (as in Cases 1-3). His 
decision to kill White issues from his strongly 
egoistic but reasons-responsive process of de-
liberation, and he has the specified first and 
second-order desires. The neural realization of 
Plum’s reasoning process and decision is ex-
actly as it is in Cases 1-3; he has the general 
ability to grasp, apply, and regulate his actions 
by moral reasons, and it is not because of an 
irresistible desire that he decides to kill. (79)
Pereboom argues that Plum’s exemption from mor-
al responsibility generalizes to this ordinary case be-
cause “there are no differences between Case 3 and 
Case 4 that would justify the claim that Plum is not 
responsible in Case 3 but is in Case 4” (79). The fact 
that in Case 4 other agents do not bring about the 
causal determination of Plum’s decision is not a rel-
evant difference according to Pereboom. Imagine, 
for example, further cases that are exactly the same 
as Case 1 or Case 2, “except that states at issue are 
instead produced by a spontaneously generated ma-
chine—a machine with no intelligent designer (Per-
eboom 2001: 115) or a force field (Mele 2005)” (79). 
Since Plum would lack moral responsibility here as 
well, Pereboom concludes “causal determination by 
other agents was not essential to what was driving 
the intuition of non-responsibility in the earlier cases” 
(79). 
For Pereboom, the best explanation for Plum’s 
non-responsibility in all four cases is that, in each, he 
is causally determined by factors beyond his control 
to decide as he does. And since Plum is not moral-
ly responsible in Case 1, and there are no differences 
between Cases 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 that 
can explain in a principled way why he would not be 
responsible in the former of each pair but would be 
in the latter, “[w]e are thus driven to the conclusion 
that he is not responsible in Case 4” (79). This, then, is 
Pereboom’s four-case argument and it represents his 
reason for rejecting compatibilism. 
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The remainder of ch.4 is dedicated to addressing 
objections to the manipulation argument, especially 
those of Alfred Mele, John Martin Fischer, Michael 
McKenna, and Daniel Haas. Roughly speaking, these 
objects can be placed in one of two general categories. 
As Michael McKenna (2008) characterizes them, 
hard-line replies to the four-case argument claim that 
Plum is morally responsible in all of the manipulation 
cases, or at the very least that it is not clear that Plum 
is not responsible in these cases (91). Soft-line replies, 
on the other hand, claim that Plum is responsible in 
some of the cases although not in others. Mele and 
Fischer put forth soft-line replies to the four-case 
argument, while McKenna and Haas opt for hard-
line replies. Since the exchange between Fischer and 
Pereboom elsewhere in this issue addresses soft-line 
replies, I will focus my attention here on McKenna’s 
hard-line reply and Pereboom’s response. 
McKenna’s central idea is that whatever attitude it is 
rational initially to have about Plum’s responsibility 
in the ordinary deterministic example transfers to the 
manipulation cases. As Pereboom describes the objec-
tion, “In his view, since it is at the outset rational for 
us to have an agnostic attitude about the claim that 
Plum is morally responsible in the ordinary determin-
istic example…, the absence of relevant differences 
[between the cases] allows this rational agnosticism to 
transfer unimpeded to the manipulation cases, thereby 
depriving them of counting in favor of incompatibi-
lism” (91). According to McKenna, the initial attitude 
we should have in the ordinary deterministic exam-
ple is that, “It is not clear that Plum is not morally 
responsible” (92). Pereboom, however, responds that 
McKenna is mistaken about the rationality of this in-
itial attitude. As he describes it: 
I have a different take on the dialectic…In 
everyday life, we assume that people can be, and 
often are, morally responsible in the basic de-
sert sense for their actions. However, we ordi-
narily do not bring to bear on this assumption 
any theory about the general causal nature of 
the universe that might threaten its rationality. 
For example, we do not seriously question the 
rationality of this assumption given the theory 
that every event, including choices and actions, 
results from deterministic causal processes that 
trace back to a time before agents existed. (92)
Pereboom maintains that if we did engage in such 
questioning, the epistemically rational attitude to 
adopt would be the neutral inquiring attitude rather 
than McKenna’s confirmed agnostic attitude. 
There are a number of different initial attitudes one 
can bring to the ordinary deterministic example. As 
Pereboom identifies them, the resolute compatibilist 
response is to “deny that under these circumstances 
causal determination poses even a prima facie threat 
to our everyday assumption, and that it is rational to 
refuse to take seriously any further consideration for 
there being such a threat” (93). A distinct approach 
affirms that causal determination provides a rea-
son for giving up the responsibility assumption, but 
claims that so far the issue has not been settled. Per-
eboom calls this the neutral inquiring response. “By 
this response it is initially epistemically rational not 
to believe that the agent in an ordinary determinis-
tic example is morally responsible in the basic desert 
sense, and not to believe that he isn’t, but to be open 
to clarifying considerations that would make one or 
other of these beliefs rational” (93). It is crucial to note 
that the neutral inquiring attitude differs significantly 
from what Pereboom calls the confirmed agnostic. The 
confirmed agnostic “claims that it is not clear that the 
ordinary causally determined agent is morally respon-
sible in the sense at issue, and that it is not clear that 
he isn’t, but, like the resolute compatibilist, maintains 
that it is rational to consider enquiry into the issue 
closed, and for this reason it is not open to further 
clarifying considerations” (93). 
Pereboom argues that the confirmed agnostic re-
sponse, the response that generates McKenna’s 
conclusion, is not the appropriate response to take. 
Instead, “the most attractive way of conceiving ma-
nipulation arguments involves supposing that the 
neutral inquiring attitude about ordinary determined 
agents is initially epistemically rational” (94). If we 
adopt the neutral inquiring attitude, “it might then 
be that an analogous manipulation case functions 
as a clarifying consideration that makes rational the 
belief that the ordinary causally determined agent is 
not morally responsible” (94). While the confirmed 
agnostic rules out this possibility, the neutral inquirer 
leaves it open. This means that “the neutral inquiring 
response is open to the potential rational influence of 
manipulation examples, and so we cannot assume that 
it transfers to the manipulation cases unaltered” (94). 
Pereboom therefore concludes that an argument that 
Smith & Franklin
Academic Publishing Corporation
www.smithandfranklin.com
Science, Religion & Culture
October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 190                                              
                              
begins with the neutral inquiring response to the or-
dinary deterministic case (the most epistemically ra-
tional attitude to adopt) will not secure agnosticism 
about manipulation cases. 
Chapter 5: Free Will Skepticism and Rational 
Deliberation
The remaining four chapters explores the implica-
tions of free will skepticism, addresses several prac-
tical concerns, and defends the optimistic view that 
life without free will and desert-based moral respon-
sibility would not be devastating to our conceptions 
of agency, morality, and meaning in life. Unlike the 
objections to libertarianism and compatibilism, re-
sistance to free will skepticism is typically driven by 
practical concerns over its implications: What would 
it mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, 
morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to 
our standing as human beings? Could we live with 
the belief that it is true? Critics contend that free will 
skepticism threatens to “undercut our self-conception 
as deliberative and rational agents, to make morality 
incoherent, leave no reason to be moral, render unjus-
tifiable our policies for dealing with wrongdoers, and 
undermine the emotions and attitudes that lie at the 
core of human interpersonal relationships” (104). In 
these concluding chapters Pereboom addresses these 
concerns one-by-one, and in the process develops the 
most thoroughgoing and nuanced account of free will 
skepticism in the literature.  
Chapter 5 begins by addressing the concern that free 
will skepticism, or more generally the belief that our 
actions are causally determined by factors beyond our 
control, threatens to conflict with the presuppositions 
of rational deliberation. Whenever we deliberate 
about what to do, we typically believe in the “open-
ness” of our options—that is, we believe we have more 
than one distinct option for which action to perform, 
each of which is available to us in the sense that we 
can or could perform each of these actions. It is often 
argued that belief in such openness is required for de-
liberation, or at least for rational deliberation (105). 
Some have argued, however, that this belief in open-
ness would conflict with the truth of determinism in 
the sense that, in any deliberative situation, the truth of 
determinism would rule out the availability to us of all 
but one distinct option for what to do, and this would 
rule out openness about what to do (106). The con-
cern is that “a belief required for rational deliberation 
would be inconsistent with an evident consequence 
of determinism for one’s actions, and if determinism 
were true, such a belief would be false” (106). Worse 
still, “a rational deliberator who believed determinism 
and its evident consequences for her actions would 
have inconsistent beliefs” (106). This line of reasoning 
suggests an incompatibility between rational deliber-
ation and believing in causal determinism—a position 
Pereboom calls deliberation-incompatibilism.    
Deliberation-incompatibilism: S’s deliberating 
and being rational is incompatible with S’s 
believing that her actions are causally deter-
mined (by causal antecedents beyond her con-
trol). (106)
The contrary position is:
Deliberation-compatibilism: S’s deliberating and 
being rational is compatible with S’s believing 
that her actions are causally determined. (106)
Pereboom sets out in ch.5 to develop and defend a 
version of deliberation-compatibilism.  
Taking as its starting point extant compatibilist re-
sponses to this challenge, Pereboom begins by reject-
ing a metaphysical reading of openness, opting in-
stead for an epistemic openness requirement. While 
other philosophers have developed similar epistemic 
conditions, existing proposals of this kind have met 
with significant opposition (107). According to Per-
eboom, “the preferable position has it that there are 
two such compatibilist beliefs—or more precisely, 
compatibilist epistemic states, and that this dual pro-
posal meets what are in effect two distinct strands in 
the incompatibilist objections to such proposals. One 
of these specifies an epistemic notion of openness for 
what to do and the other is an epistemic condition on 
the efficacy of deliberation” (107). Pereboom’s account 
of deliberation-compatibilism therefore requires two 
kinds of epistemic conditions: an epistemic openness 
condition and a deliberative efficacy condition. 
Pereboom’s epistemic openness condition builds off 
conditions first proposed by Tomis Kapitan (1986) 
and Dana Nelkin (2004b). In an attempt to avoid ob-
jections to these conditions, Pereboom puts forth the 
following revised version: 
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(S) In order to deliberate rationally among dis-
tinct actions A1…An, for each Ai, S cannot be 
certain of the proposition that she will do Ai, 
nor of the proposition that she will not do Ai; 
and either (a) the proposition that she will do 
Ai is consistent with every proposition that, in 
the present context, is settled for her, or (b) if it 
is inconsistent with some such proposition, she 
cannot believe that it is. (113)
Clause (a) deals with cases of consistent settled prop-
ositions, where a proposition’s being settled for an 
agent is defined as follows:  
(Settled) A proposition is settled for an agent 
just in case she believes it and disregards any 
uncertainty she has that it is true, e.g., for the 
purpose of deliberation. (113).
Clause (b) is included to deal with the concern that I 
can rationally deliberate about whether to do A even 
if in fact doing A is inconsistent with a proposition 
I regard as settled in that context. Here, Pereboom 
maintains, “it is crucial that I then not believe that it 
is inconsistent; if I did believe this, it’s intuitive that I 
couldn’t rationally deliberate about whether to do A” 
(114). 
While condition (S) together with (Settled) is ca-
pable of dealing with a number of deliberation-in-
compatibilist objections, Pereboom maintains that an 
additional condition is required that incorporates the 
belief in the efficacy of deliberation. This condition 
maintains:
(DE) In order to rationally deliberate about 
whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2 are 
distinct actions, an agent must believe that if 
as a result of her deliberating about whether to 
do A1 or A2 she were to judge that it would be 
best to do A1, then, under normal conditions, 
she would also, on the basis of this delibera-
tion, do A1; and similarly for A2. (118-19). 
This condition is needed to deal with cases like Peter 
van Inwagen’s locked door example:
…imagine that [an agent] is in a room with 
two doors and that he believes one of the doors 
to be unlocked and other door to be locked 
and impassable, though he has no idea which 
is which; let him then attempt to imagine 
himself deliberating about which door to leave 
by. (1983, 154)
In this example, I am neither certain that I will open 
door 1, nor that I will not (and the same for door 2). 
And my opening door 1 (or door 2) is consistent with 
what is settled for me in the sense specified. “Thus this 
example poses a threat to (S) together with (Settled) 
as a compatibilist account for beliefs required for de-
liberation” (116). It is for this reason that Pereboom 
adds the efficacy of deliberation requirement. Once 
(DE) is introduced, van Inwagen’s concern, along 
with several other concerns Pereboom considers, can 
be addressed since (DE) is not met by the agent in 
such situations.  
The conclusion of ch.5 is that rational deliberation 
requires satisfaction of both an epistemic-openness 
condition and a belief-in-deliberative-efficacy condi-
tion. According to Pereboom, “(S) together with (Set-
tled), and (DE) appear not to be vulnerable to objec-
tions that have been raised against other compatibilist 
proposals for the beliefs required for deliberation, and 
this in turn provides reason to think that a deliber-
ation-incompatibilism…can be successfully resisted” 
(126). If Pereboom’s account succeeds, then there is 
no inconsistency between rational deliberation and 
believing in causal determinism—that is, it is possible 
for an agent to believe that causal antecedents beyond 
her control causally determine her actions and still be 
capable of rational deliberation. 
Chapter 6: Moral Responsibility without Basic 
Desert
As we’ve seen, free will skepticism denies that we have 
the sort of free will required for moral responsibili-
ty in the basic desert sense. There are, however, other 
notions of moral responsibility besides basic desert 
whose essential features can be endorsed by the skep-
tic. Pereboom, for example, sets out and defends a for-
ward-looking account of moral responsibility that is 
perfectly consistent with free will skepticism. He ar-
gues that “moral axiological judgments can serve as a 
foundation for this forward-looking sense of respon-
sibility, and that such judgments are not threatened 
by the kinds of considerations that undermine moral 
responsibility in the basic desert sense” (127). While 
deontological judgments may not fare as well, Pere-
boom contends that “the axiological moral judgments 
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and the forward-looking sense of responsibility are 
sufficient given the interests of morality” (127). 
The justification and goal of Pereboom’s forward-look-
ing account of moral responsibility is to “moderate or 
eliminate dispositions to misconduct” (131) and to 
provide protection from harm and reconciliation in 
relationships. It’s reasonable to assume that if such 
dispositions to misconduct are manifest in past ac-
tions they will persist unless corrective measures are 
taken. 
Thus when an agent has acted badly, one might 
ask him: “Why did you decide to do that? Or, 
Do you think it was the right thing to do?” 
where the point of asking such questions is to 
have him recognize and acknowledge a dispo-
sition to behave immorally. If the reasons given 
in response to such questions indicate that he 
does have such a disposition, it then becomes 
apt to request an effort to eliminate it. En-
gaging in such interactions will be legitimate 
in light of how they contribute to the agent’s 
moral improvement. (132)
This model is a variety of the answerability sense of 
moral responsibility defended by Scanlon (1998) and 
Hilary Bok (1998), and it’s available for free will skep-
tics to endorse without inconsistency. 
Pereboom’s more specific proposal takes as its inspi-
ration a revised version of Michael McKenna’s (2012) 
recently developed conversational theory of moral re-
sponsibility. McKenna’s account holds that blaming 
someone is an expression of a sentiment or attitude, 
such as moral resentment or indignation, and its func-
tion is to communicate moral disapproval to the agent 
in light of the quality of will she indicated through her 
actions. As Pereboom describes McKenna’s account: 
When a morally responsible person acts, she 
understands that members of the moral com-
munity might assign such a meaning to her 
action. When her acts are morally charged, 
she appreciates that she might be introducing 
a meaningful contribution to such a conversa-
tional exchange with others. This initial stage 
McKenna calls moral contribution. The second 
stage, in which that agent is blamed by a re-
spondent, he labels moral address. In the third 
stage, moral account, the blamed agent extends 
the conversation by offering an excuse, a justi-
fication, or an apology. The responded might at 
this point continue the conversation perhaps 
by forgiving or punishing. In a further stage 
the blamed agent may be restored to full status 
in the moral community. This moral responsi-
bility exchange is modeled on analogy with 
an ordinary conversational exchange between 
speakers of a natural language. (132) 
Pereboom maintains that an amended version of 
McKenna’s account is available for free will skeptics 
to adopt without inconsistence, as long as it avoids an 
appeal to basic desert and to expressions of reactive 
attitudes that are linked with beliefs about basic de-
sert (133).
Pereboom’s modified account grounds blame, not in 
basic desert, but in three non-desert invoking mor-
al desiderata: “protection of potential victims, recon-
ciliation to relationships both personal and with the 
moral community more generally, and moral forma-
tion” (134). Pereboom argues, “Immoral actions are 
often harmful, and we have a right to protect our-
selves and others from those who are disposed to be-
have harmfully. Immoral actions can also impair rela-
tionships and we have a moral interest undoing such 
impairment through reconciliation. And because we 
value morally good character and resulting action, we 
have a stake in the formation of moral character when 
it is plagued by dispositions to misconduct” (134). 
A forward-looking account of moral responsibility 
grounded in future protection, future reconciliation, 
and future moral formation is in harmony with free 
will skepticism since it does not appeal to basic desert 
in any way.  
While Pereboom focuses primarily on his account of 
blame, he does note that a corresponding account of 
praise is available as well. Of the three aims of blame—
moral formation, protection, and reconciliation—the 
one most clearly amendable to praise, he argues, is 
moral formation. “We praise an agent for a morally 
exemplary action to encourage him to strengthen the 
disposition that produced it.” Furthermore, “This can 
have a protective function, since strengthening such 
dispositions has the effect of reducing dangerous be-
havior.” As for reconciliation, the corresponding no-
tion with regard to praise could be “celebrating suc-
cess in a relationship” (135).
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On the conversational model, it is the agent’s ration-
ality that is engaged in the proposed process for both 
blame and praise. In the case of blame, for example, 
“at the stage of moral address we request an expla-
nation with the intent of having the agent acknowl-
edge a disposition to act badly, and then, if he has in 
fact so acted without excuse or justification, we aim 
for him to come to see that the disposition issuing in 
the action is best eliminated” (135). In normal cases, 
this change is produced by way of the agent’s recog-
nition of moral reasons to eliminate the disposition. 
Accordingly, on Pereboom’s account “it is an agent’s 
responsiveness to reasons (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 
1998), together with the fact that we have a moral 
interest in our protection, his moral formation, and 
our reconciliation with him, that explains why he is an 
appropriate recipient of blame in this forward-look-
ing sense” (135-36). A similar case can be made for 
praise. So while many compatibilists see some type of 
attunement to reasons as the key condition for basic 
desert moral responsibility, Pereboom instead views it 
“as the most significant condition for a notion of re-
sponsibility that focuses on protection, reconciliation, 
and moral formation” (136). 
A critic may question what form blame will take ab-
sent overt expressions of moral resentment and indig-
nation, and will it be effective? But here Pereboom 
argues, “first, that there are alternative attitudes ex-
pression of which is not linked with beliefs about ba-
sic desert, communication of which can be as effective 
morally as expressions of resentment and indignation, 
and second, that in certain important respects blame 
without expression of these reactive attitudes is to 
be preferred (Pereboom 2001, 2009a; cf. Honderich 
1988)” (146). For example, when someone is mistreat-
ed in a relationship, there are other emotions available 
besides resentment and indignation—these emotions 
include “feeling disappointed, hurt or shocked about 
what the offender has done, moral concern for him, 
and moral sadness and sorrow generated by this con-
cern when the harm done is serious” (146). Commu-
nicating such disappointment, sadness, or concern can 
be quite effective in motivating avoidance of future 
misbehavior. In addition, communication of such al-
ternatives to resentment and indignation “is not typ-
ically aggressive in the way that expression of anger 
can be, and will usually not have its intimidating ef-
fect” (147). 
Pereboom acknowledges that sometimes circum-
stances require a more aggressive and intimidating 
emotional attitude. But here too skeptical alternatives 
are available. Take, for example, the right of self de-
fense and defense of others. Here we are justified in 
expressing fury since it is an attitude consistent with 
free will skepticism. Fury, according to Pereboom, 
“is an emotion we share with bears and wolves, and 
has no cognitive content or presupposition or asso-
ciated belief that involves the notion of desert” (147). 
Pereboom’s account therefore maintains that “moral 
sadness and sorrow—accompanied by a resolve for 
fairness and justice, or to improve personal relation-
ships—will serve societal and personal relationships 
as well as resent and indignation does. And when act-
ing on the right of self defense and defense of others 
in a dangerous situation is at issue, fury is appropriate, 
and not in conflict with free will skepticism” (148).  
Additionally, adopting this skeptical account of moral 
responsibility has the potential benefit of relinquish-
ing us of an often-destructive form of moral anger. 
Anger in relationships is nourished by the belief that 
its target is blameworthy in some way for having done 
wrong (149). Furthermore, the “anger that fuels eth-
nic conflict often results partly from the belief that an 
opposing group so deserves blame for some atrocity” 
(149). Free will skepticism “advocates retracting such 
beliefs because they are false, as a result of which the 
associated anger might be diminished, and its expres-
sions reduced” (150). Expression of resentment and 
indignation is potentially harmful since it is “more 
likely to occasion destructive resistance than is ex-
pression of moral concern and the moral sadness or 
sorrow that such concern is apt to generate” (150). 
Furthermore, “overt blame fueled by resentment and 
indignation arguably renders it particularly suscepti-
ble to errors that threaten to undermine the integrity 
and effectiveness of the moral conversation” (150). It 
would be beneficial, therefore, if we could rid our-
selves of these potentially harmful reactive attitudes, 
and adopting free will skepticism and Pereboom’s 
forward-looking account of moral responsibility pro-
vides us with a path forward for doing so.  
Chapter 7: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal 
Behavior
Chapter 7 deals with another frequently voiced crit-
icism of free will skepticism: that it is unable to ade-
quately deal with criminal behavior and that the re-
sponses it would permit as justified are insufficient for 
Smith & Franklin
Academic Publishing Corporation
www.smithandfranklin.com
Science, Religion & Culture
October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 194                                              
                              
acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two 
factors. The first is that “one of the most prominent 
justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, 
is incompatible with free will skepticism” (153). The 
second, which Pereboom willingly acknowledges, is 
that “alternative justifications that are not ruled out 
by the skeptical view per se face significant independ-
ent moral objections.” Yet despite these concerns, 
Pereboom forcefully argues that “free will skepticism 
leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal be-
havior, in particular preventive detention, rehabilita-
tion, and alteration of relevant social conditions,” and 
“these methods are both morally justifiable and suffi-
cient for good social policy” (153).
First, it’s important to note that retributive punish-
ment is incompatible with free will skepticism be-
cause it maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer 
is justified for the reason that he deserves something 
bad to happen to him just because he has knowingly 
done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or 
death (157). For the retributivist, it is the basic desert 
attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that 
provides the justification for punishment. This means 
that the retributivist position is not reducible to con-
sequentialist considerations nor does it appeal “to a 
good such as the safety of society, or the moral im-
provement of the criminal in justifying punishment” 
(157). Free will skepticism undermines this justifica-
tion for punishment because it does away with the 
idea of basic desert—“if agents do not deserve blame 
just because they have knowingly done wrong, neither 
do they deserve punishment just because they have 
knowingly done wrong” (157). 
Some critics worry that without retributive punish-
ment the free will skeptic is left unable to adequately 
deal with criminal behavior. But Pereboom notes that 
there are several alternative ways of justifying crimi-
nal punishment (and dealing with criminal behavior 
more generally) that do not appeal to the notion of 
basic desert and are thus not threatened by free will 
skepticism. These include moral education theories, 
deterrence theories, punishment justified by the right 
to harm in self-defense, and incapacitation theories. 
While Pereboom maintains the first two approaches 
face independent moral objections—objections that, 
though perhaps not devastating, make them less de-
sirable than their alternative—he argues that an in-
capacitation account built on the right to harm in 
self-defense provides the best option for justifying a 
policy for treatment of criminals consistent with free 
will skepticism. Before turning to Pereboom’s positive 
account, let me briefly say something about the first 
two alternative approaches.     
Moral education theories draw an analogy with jus-
tification of the punishment of children. “Children 
are typically not punished to exact retribution, but 
rather to educate them morally” (161). Since moral 
education is a generally acceptable goal, a justification 
for criminal punishment based on this analogy is one 
the free will skeptic can potentially accept. Pereboom 
notes, however, that a “serious concern for this type 
of theory is that it is far from evident that punishing 
adult criminals is similarly likely to result in moral im-
provement” (161). Children and adult criminals differ 
in significant respects. For example, “[a]dult criminals, 
unlike children, typically understand the moral code 
accepted in their society” (161). Furthermore, “[c]
hildren are generally more psychologically malleable 
than adult criminals are” (162). For these and other 
reasons, Pereboom sees this approach as less desirable 
than an alternative incapacitation account. 
Deterrence theories, especially utilitarian deterrence 
theories, have probably been the most discussed alter-
native to retributivism. According to deterrence the-
ories, “the prevention of criminal wrongdoing serves 
as the good on the basis of which punishment is jus-
tified” (163). The classic deterrence theory is Jeremy 
Bentham’s:
In his conception, the state’s policy on crimi-
nal behavior should aim at maximizing utility, 
and punishment is legitimately administered 
if and only if it does so. The pain or unhap-
piness produced by punishment results from 
the restriction on freedom that ensues from 
the threat of punishment, the anticipation of 
punishment by the person who has been sen-
tenced, the pain of actual punishment, and the 
sympathetic pain felt by others such as the 
friends and family of the criminal (Bentham 
1823). The most significant pleasure or hap-
piness that results from punishment derives 
from the security of those who benefit from its 
capacity to deter. (163-64)
While deterrence theories are completely compatible 
with free will skepticism, Pereboom notes three gener-
al moral objections against them. The first is that they 
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will justify punishments that are intuitively too severe: 
“For it would seem that in certain cases harsh punish-
ment would be more effective deterrents than milder 
forms, while the harsh punishments are intuitively too 
severe to be fair” (164). The second concern is that 
such accounts would seem to justify punishing the in-
nocent: “If after a series of horrible crimes the actual 
perpetrator is not caught, potential criminals might 
come to believe that they can get away with serious 
wrongdoing. Under such circumstances it might max-
imize utility to frame and punish an innocent person” 
(164). Lastly, there is the “use” objection, which is a 
problem for utilitarianism more generally. Utilitarian-
ism “sometimes requires people to be harmed severely, 
without their consent, in order to benefit others, and 
this is often intuitively wrong” (165). 
Despite Pereboom’s rejection of these alternatives to 
retributivism, he does believe there is a legitimate 
theory for prevention of especially dangerous crime 
that is neither undercut by free will skepticism nor by 
other moral considerations. This theory is based on an 
analogy with quarantine and draws on a comparison 
between treatment of dangerous criminals and treat-
ment of carriers of dangerous diseases. As Pereboom 
describes it: 
The free will skeptic claims that criminals are 
not morally responsible for their actions in the 
basic desert sense. Plainly, many carriers of 
dangerous diseases are not responsible in this 
or in any sense for having contracted these dis-
eases. We generally agree that it is sometimes 
permissible to quarantine them nevertheless. 
But then, even if a dangerous criminal is not 
morally responsible for his crimes in the basic 
desert sense (perhaps because no one is ever 
in this way morally responsible) it could be as 
legitimate to preventatively detain him as to 
quarantine the non-responsible carrier of a se-
rious communicable disease. (156)
Furthermore, this analogy places several constraints 
on the treatment of criminals.  
…as less dangerous diseases justify only pre-
ventative measures less restrictive than quar-
antine, so less dangerous criminal tendencies 
justify only more moderate restraints. In ad-
dition, the incapacitation account that results 
from this analogy demands a degree of con-
cern for the rehabilitation and well-being of 
the criminal that would alter much of current 
practice. Just as fairness recommends that we 
seek to cure the diseased we quarantine, so 
fairness would counsel that we attempt to re-
habilitate the criminals we detain (cf. D’An-
gelo 1968: 56-9). If a criminal cannot be reha-
bilitated, and our safety requires his indefinite 
confinement, this account provides no justifi-
cation for making his life more miserable than 
would be required to guard against the danger 
he poses. Finally, there are measures for pre-
venting crime more generally, such as provid-
ing for adequate education and mental health 
care, which the free will skeptic can readily en-
dorse. (156)
This is Pereboom’s incapacitation account and it pro-
vides a more resilient proposal for justifying treatment 
of criminals than either the moral education or deter-
rence theories of criminal punishment.
One advantage this approach has over the utilitarian 
deterrence theory is that it has more restrictions placed 
on it with regard to using people merely as a means. 
Concerns over the “use” objection, for example, “count 
more heavily against punishment policy justified on 
consequentialist grounds than they do against inca-
pacitation based on the quarantine analogy” (169). 
And this is because, “on the quarantine analogy, as it 
is illegitimate to treat carriers of a disease more harm-
fully than is necessary to neutralize the danger they 
pose, treating those with violent criminal tendencies 
more harshly than is required to protect society will 
be illegitimate as well” (169). Furthermore, “the less 
dangerous the disease, the less invasive the justified 
prevention methods would be, and similarly, the less 
dangerous the criminal, the less invasive the justified 
forms of incapacitation would be” (170). In fact, for 
certain minor crimes “perhaps only some degree of 
monitoring could be defended” (170). 
Summarizing Pereboom’s proposal, then, the core idea 
is that “the right to harm in self-defense and defense 
of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dan-
gerous with the minimum harm required for adequate 
protection” (174). The resulting account would not 
justify the sort of criminal punishment whose legiti-
macy is most dubious, “such as death or confinement 
in the most common kinds of prisons in our society” 
(174). Pereboom’s account also “demands a certain 
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level of care and attention to the well-being of crim-
inals, which would change much of current policy” 
(174). Furthermore, free will skeptics would continue 
to endorse measures for reducing crime that aim at al-
tering social conditions, “such as improving education, 
increasing opportunities for fulfilling employment, 
and enhancing care for the mentally ill” (174). This 
combined approach to dealing with criminal behavior, 
it is argued, is sufficient for dealing with dangerous 
criminals, leads to a more humane and affective social 
policy, and is actually preferable to the harsh and of-
ten excessive forms of punishment that typically come 
with retributivism. 
Chapter 8: Personal Relationships and Mean-
ing in Life
Another set of concerns people have with free will 
skepticism is that it would negatively impact our 
personal relationships and meaning in life. Some 
fear that life without free will would have no point 
or purpose and a dispirited resignation to fate would 
result (175). Another closely related concern is that 
taking the skeptical view would threaten our person-
al relationships and the fulfillment in life that they 
provide. P. F. Strawson (1962), for example, developed 
a philosophical elaboration of this reaction. “For him 
a skeptical conviction, supposing it was psychologi-
cally possible for us, would undermine expressions of 
the other-directed reactive attitudes essential to good 
personal relationships, and would jeopardize self-di-
rected reactive attitudes such as guilt, and repentance, 
crucial to relationships and also to personal moral de-
velopment” (175). Pereboom, in his final chapter, re-
sponds to these concerns and makes his final case for 
optimistic skepticism. 
Pereboom argues that “the skeptical perspective does 
not threaten personal relationships, and that it holds 
out the promise of better relationships through release 
from reactive attitudes such as moral resentment and 
indignation” (175). Just as the Stoics argued that “af-
firming determinism while taking a broader perspec-
tive can produce an advantageous sort of equanimity” 
(175), Pereboom maintains that “Spinoza was right to 
contend that skepticism about free will can encourage 
a kind of peace of mind that would be a significant 
benefit for us” (176). While it is an empirical question 
(currently without answer) whether living in accord-
ance with the skeptical perspective would be on the 
whole better for us, Pereboom is “optimistic that this 
sort of life would be better for us all things consid-
ered” (176). 
It has already been argued in previous chapters that 
free will skepticism leaves intact much of what is im-
portant to us in human life: the rationality of deliber-
ation, a forward-looking sense of moral responsibil-
ity, preventing crime, etc. Here Pereboom considers 
the additional question: Is the assumption that we 
are morally responsible in the basic desert sense re-
quired for the meaningful and fulfilling personal re-
lationships we have? P. F. Strawson delivers a posi-
tive answer, fearing that if we embraced the skeptical 
perspective we would end up adopting an “objectivity 
of attitude” toward others, an attitude that rules out 
good personal relationships.
Pereboom disagrees.  
I think that Strawson is right to believe that 
objectivity of attitude would jeopardize our 
personal relationships, but that he is mistaken 
to hold that such a stance would result or be 
appropriate if the causal determination of our 
actions by factors beyond our control did pose 
a genuine threat to expression of the reactive 
attitudes (Pereboom 1995, 2001). First, some 
of our reactive attitudes, although their expres-
sions would be doxastically irrational for free 
will skeptics, are not required for good per-
sonal relationships. On the skeptical view, an 
expression of resentment or indignation will 
invoke doxastic irrationality when it is accom-
panied by the belief—as in my view it always 
is—that its target deserves in the basic sense 
to be its recipient. But I maintain that expres-
sions of these reactive attitudes are suboptimal 
as modes of communication in relationships 
relative to alternative attitudes available to 
us. Second, the attitudes whose expression we 
would want to retain either are not threatened 
by a skeptical conviction because they are not 
associated with beliefs that conflict with this 
view, or else they have analogues not connect-
ed with such beliefs. The attitudes and ana-
logues expressions of which would survive do 
not amount to Strawson’s objectivity of atti-
tude, and are sufficient to sustain good person-
al relationships (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2007a, 
2009a). (179)
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The remainder of ch.8 is dedicated to examining the 
suboptimal nature of resentment and indignation, 
spelling out the benefits of alternative attitudes and 
analogues that are left unaffected by the skeptical per-
spective, and briefly discussing the consequences of 
free will skepticism for our life’s projects.    
Moral resentment, as Pereboom defines it, is “anger 
with an agent due to a wrong he has done to oneself,” 
and indignation is “anger with an agent because of a 
wrong he has done to a third party” (179). While these 
attitudes play an important communicative role in 
personal and societal relationships, Pereboom argues 
that there are other emotions present or available not 
challenged by the skeptical view that are preferable 
to anger and “whose expression can also convey the 
relevant information” (180). These emotions include 
“feeling hurt or shocked or disappointed about what 
the offending agent has done, and moral sadness or 
sorrow and concern for him” (180). These substitutes 
are preferable to resentment and indignation because 
the latter attitudes are “apt to have harmful effects.” 
Expression of resentment and indignation “often fails 
to contribute to the well being of those to whom it is 
directed” (180). And as Pereboom notes: “Frequently 
it is intended to cause physical or emotional pain, and 
can give rise to destructive resistance instead of recon-
ciliation. As a result, it has the potential to damage or 
destroy relationships” (180). 
To be clear, though, Pereboom is not committed to the 
view that we can generally succeed in completely over-
coming moral resentment and indignation, “but rath-
er to the proposal that we can resist such attitudes and 
limit their expressions with some success, and that we 
can oppose actions and policies justified on the basis 
of the beliefs about basic desert that accompany such 
attitudes” (182). Following Shaun Nichols (2007), one 
could distinguish between narrow-profile emotional 
responses, which are local or immediate emotional re-
action to situations, and wide-profile responses, which 
are not immediate and can involve rational reflections. 
Pereboom maintains that “[f ]ree will skeptics can ex-
pect that we will not keep ourselves from some degree 
of narrow-profile, immediate resentment when we 
are seriously wronged in our most intimate person-
al relationships.” Nevertheless, “in some wide-profile 
cases, we could well have the ability to diminish or 
even eliminate resentment and indignation, or at least 
disavow it in the sense of rejecting any force it might 
be thought to have in justifying harmful reactions to 
the wrong done, and given a skeptical conviction we 
might take such measures for the sake of morality and 
rationality” (181). 
Moving on to the attitudes of guilt and repentance, 
Pereboom addresses the concern that such self-di-
rected attitudes are threatened by free will skepticism. 
One may object that since these attitudes are essential 
to good interpersonal relationships for agent like us 
who can behavior immorally, and since these attitudes 
are incompatible with free will skepticism, adopting 
the skeptical perspective would have a negative affect 
on our relationships. “Without the attitudes of guilt 
and repentance,” it could be argued, “we would not be 
motivated to moral improvement after acting badly, 
we would be barred from subsequent restoration of 
moral integrity” (186). Pereboom responds, however, 
by arguing that there are substitutes that work just as 
well as guilt and repentance. 
[S]uppose that you do wrong, but because you 
believe that free will skepticism is true, you re-
ject the claim that you are blameworthy in the 
basic desert sense. Instead, you accept that you 
have done wrong, you feel deeply disappointed 
that you were the agent of wrongdoing, and 
as Waller advocates, you feel deep sorrow and 
regret for what you have done…In addition, 
because you have commitment to doing what 
is right, and to personal improvement, you 
resolve to do what you can to eliminate your 
disposition to act this way, and perhaps seek to 
help this change. (186-87)
None of this, argues Pereboom, is undercut by the 
skeptical conviction.
Similar arguments are given for the attitudes of for-
giveness, gratitude, and love. Pereboom argues that 
the skeptical perspective has no trouble preserving all 
three of these attitudes—or at least the core aspects of 
each. Forgiveness, for example, need not presuppose 
that the person being forgiven deserves to be blamed 
in the basic desert sense (188). Gratitude, likewise, 
need not involve the belief that an agent is praisewor-
thy for some action. For example, “one can be thankful 
to a young child for some kindness without believ-
ing that she is morally responsible for it” (190). And 
the joy involved in gratitude is also consistent with 
skepticism: “No feature of the skeptical view poses a 
threat to the legitimacy of being joyful and expressing 
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joy when others are considerate or generous in one’s 
behalf ” (190). The same can be said about love. “Love 
of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well 
for the other, taking on aims and projects of the other 
as one’s own, and a desire to be together with the oth-
er.” According to Pereboom, “[f ]ree will skepticism 
does not threaten any of this” (190). 
The final concern Pereboom addresses has to do with 
our life’s projects. He asks: “Would it be difficult for 
us to cope without a conception of ourselves as cred-
it- or praiseworthy for achieving what makes our 
lives fulfilled, happy, satisfactory, or worthwhile—for 
realizing what Honderich calls our life-hopes (Hon-
derich 1988: 382ff.)?” (193). Pereboom argues that 
while there is an aspect of these life-hopes that may 
be undercut by skepticism, the skeptical perspective 
nevertheless leaves them largely intact. Achievement 
and life-hopes are not as closely connected to basic 
desert praiseworthiness as some critics suppose. For 
example, “[i]f someone hopes for success in some pro-
ject, and if she accomplishes what she hoped for, intu-
itively this outcome would be an achievement of hers 
even if she is not in this particular way praiseworthy 
for it…” (193). 
Free will skepticism need not instill in us an attitude 
of resignation to whatever our behavioral dispositions 
together with environmental conditions hold in store. 
“Even if what we know about our dispositions and 
environment give us reason to believe that our futures 
will turn out in a particular way, it can often be rea-
sonable to hope that they will turn out differently” 
(194). But for this to be so, “it may be important that 
we lack complete knowledge of our dispositions and 
environmental conditions” (194). Suppose, for exam-
ple, that someone reasonably believes that he has a 
particular disposition that might well be a hindrance 
to realizing a life-hope. Because he does not know 
“whether this disposition will in fact have this effect, 
it remains open for him—that is, epistemically possi-
ble for him—that another disposition of his will allow 
him to transcend this impediment” (194). As a result, 
he might reasonably hope that he will overcome his 
fear (or whatever the disposition may be) and achieve 
his goal. So for the free will skeptic, if he in fact does 
overcome his fear and succeed at his life’s-hope, “this 
will not be an achievement of his in quite as robust a 
sense as we might naturally suppose, but it will be an 
achievement in a substantial sense nonetheless” (194). 
For Pereboom, our sense of self-worth “is to a 
non-trivial extent due to features not produced by our 
volitions, let alone by free will” (194). He points out 
that people “place great value on natural beauty, native 
athletic ability, and intelligence, none of which have 
their source in our volition” (194). Of course we also 
value voluntary efforts—“in productive work and al-
truistic behavior, and in the formation of moral char-
acter” (194)—but Pereboom argues that it does not 
matter much to us that these voluntary efforts are also 
freely willed. Consider how good character comes to 
be. 
It is plausibly formed to a significant degree 
by upbringing, and the belief that this is so is 
widespread. Parents regard themselves as hav-
ing failed in raising their children if they turn 
out with immoral dispositions, and they typi-
cally take great care to bring their children up 
to prevent such an outcome. Accordingly, peo-
ple often come to believe that they have the 
good moral character they do largely because 
they were raised with love and skill. But those 
who believe this about themselves seldom ex-
perience dismay because of it. We tend not to 
become dispirited upon coming to understand 
that good moral character is not our own do-
ing, and that we do not deserve a great deal of 
praise or credit for it. By contrast, we often feel 
fortunate and thankful. (195)
If Pereboom is correct, then there is no reason to think 
that our sense that we have value and that our lives are 
worth living is threatened by free will skepticism. 
Conclusion 
Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life 
makes a strong case for the conclusion that we lack the 
sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the 
basic desert sense. It also makes a strong case for op-
timistic skepticism, arguing that free will skepticism 
can preserve most of what we care about—includ-
ing the rationality of deliberation, a forward-looking 
sense of moral responsibility, preventing crime, and 
meaning in life. Not only is the skeptical perspective 
“compatible with a veridical sense of accomplishment 
when we succeed in our projects,” Pereboom argues 
that it’s also compatible with good personal relation-
ships and meaning in life. With regard to our friend-
ships, for example, “it holds out the promise of greater 
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equanimity by reducing the expression of resentment 
and indignation that often impairs them” (199). It is 
for these reasons that Pereboom concludes: “If we did 
give up the assumption of the sort of free will at issue, 
then, perhaps surprisingly, we might be better off as a 
result” (199). 
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